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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
BRIAN SWINK, : Case No. 990501-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Attempted Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1999) (Theft) & 76-4-101 (1999) (Attempt), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on 
this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
See Addendum A (judgment and conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
a confession ruade by Appellant without benefit of warnings set 
forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Standard of Review: "In reviewing the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating statements, 
we examine the trial court's 'underlying factual findings for 
clear error,1 and ''review the trial court's conclusions of law 
based [on those findings] for correctness.''" State v. Yoder, 935 
P.2d 534, 545 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations omitted). "When, [as 
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in the present case,] a trial court bases its 'ultimate 
conclusions concerning . . . defendant's Miranda rights ... upon 
essentially undisputed facts . . .' its conclusions present 
questions of law . . . review[ed] under a correction of error 
standard." State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App.1993) 
(quoting State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App.1990), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 
914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Brian Swink's ("Swink") motion to suppress his 
illegally obtained confession is preserved on the record for 
appeal ("R.") at 23-26,70. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is determinative of 
the issues on appeal: 
Amendment V, United States Constitution: 
No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Swink was charged by information with one count of theft of 
a vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404. R.6-7. Swink moved to suppress statements that 
formed the basis of the charge and which were taken from him 
without benefit of warnings set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 
2 
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U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1976), 
in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. R. 23-26;70. 
The trial court denied Swink's motion, finding that there 
was neither custody nor an interrogation for purposes of Miranda. 
R.39,-71 [3-5] . Consequently, Swink entered a conditional guilty 
plea to attempted theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (theft) & 76-4-101 (attempt). R.41-
43,71[6-14]. See Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i) (1999); State v. Sery, 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Swink appeals from the denial of 
his motion to suppress his illegally obtained confession. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The undisputed facts are as follows: 
Appellant Swink was a participant in the Genesis Youth 
Center ("Genesis"). Genesis is an unsecured facility that 
provides a work program designed for youth offenders to work off 
restitution, community service hours, and fines. R.69[12]. 
Swink was originally sentenced to the Decker Lake Youth 
Corrections facility ("Decker Lake"), but was transferred to 
Genesis on a ninety-day trial placement basis in anticipation of 
his parole from Decker Lake. Id. 
On January 5, 1999, Swink and another Genesis participant 
ran away from the program. R.69[15-17]. At approximately 5:00 
p.m. on the same day, Swink called Decker Lake to turn himself 
in. R.69[18]. A Decker Lake employee contacted Officer Corbett 
Ford ("Ford") of the Salt Lake City Police Department to retrieve 
3 
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Swink. R.69[28]. Ford called Swink to obtain his address. Id. 
Ford told Swink that it would be one-and-one-half hours before he 
could pick him up. Id. Swink waited for Ford until he arrived 
to escort him back to Decker Lake. R.69[33]. 
Ford returned Swink to Decker Lake by 7:00 p.m. R.69 
[18,29] . Swink was stripped of his street clothes, placed in 
Decker Lake issue clothing, searched for contraband, and placed 
into state custody on the basis of a fugitive warrant that was 
issued when he fled from Genesis. R.69[21-22]. Swink was not 
hand-cuffed. R.69[22]. According to Chris Pacheco ("Pacheco"), 
a counselor at Decker Lake and a youth corrections officer, Swink 
was not at liberty to leave when he was returned to Decker Lake, 
having been detained on the fugitive warrant. R.69[21]. Pacheco 
further testified that he detained Swink on the warrant by his 
own authority as a youth corrections officer. R.69[21]. 
Pacheco received Swink at Decker Lake and initiated an 
intake interview. R.69[12,20,21]. Pacheco testified at Swink's 
preliminary hearing that the purpose of the intake interview was 
to determine whether Swink was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, and whether he was suicidal or otherwise in need of 
medical attention. R.69[13]. He also testified that the purpose 
of the interview was to secure the safety of both Swink and 
Decker Lake. Id. 
To this end, Pacheco asked Swink where he had been and what 
he had been up to while on the run. R.69[14]. Initially, Swink 
responded that he and one other person had run away from Genesis 
4 
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and ended up at South Towne Mall in the afternoon. R.69[14]. 
Pacheco testified that Swink's story had gaps, leading Pacheco to 
believe that Swink was lying and prompting him to press Swink for 
more information. R.69[15,24]. 
Pacheco testified that, upon questioning, Swink stated, "F 
it, I'll probably get in trouble anyway." R.69[15,24]. Swink 
told how he and the second person, named Azar, went to a 
convenience store and made a phone call. R.69[16]. They were 
picked up and taken to Azar's home, then to a grocery store where 
Swink stole a screwdriver. R.69[16]. Swink proceeded to Trolley 
Square, then walked along 700 East until he came upon a Toyota 
minivan. Id. He started the van by inserting the screwdriver 
into the ignition. Id. Swink told Pacheco that he drove away in 
the van. R.69[16-17] . 
Pacheco continued questioning Swink. Id. Swink described 
how he drove to South Towne Mall. Id. Swink was chased from the 
mall by mall security. Id. He got back into the van and left. 
Id. He abandoned the van and called Decker Lake to turn himself 
in. R.69 [18] . Pacheco never administered Miranda warnings at 
any point during his interview with Swink, testifying that he is 
not required to administer such warnings. R.69[25]. 
Officer Ford, who was present throughout Pacheco's interview 
with Swink, testified that it became apparent that Swink was 
involved in an auto theft. R.69[33-34]. Ford also testified 
that Swink was in custody and was not free to leave during the 
questioning. R.69[34]. However, Ford likewise failed to give 
5 
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Swink Miranda warnings. Id. At the end of the interview, Ford 
asked Swink where the stolen van was located because Swink had 
earlier indicated that the van was still running. R.69[30]. 
Swink revealed the van's location and Ford accordingly called the 
SLCPD. R.69[31]. Ford verified that the van was stolen and 
called for recovery. Id. The SLCPD recovered the van and 
returned it to it's owner. R.69[32]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that 
the undisputed facts presented at the preliminary hearing did not 
amount to a custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda and, 
consequently, in denying Swink's motion to suppress his non-
Mirandized statement obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT SWINK'S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE ALTHOUGH 
IT WAS TAKEN AS THE RESULT OF A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1976), the United States Supreme 
Court held: 
the prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates 
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure 
6 
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the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . As for 
the procedural safeguards to be employed, . . . the 
following measures are required. Prior to any 
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make 
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained 
or appointed. The defendant may waive the effectuation 
of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 
Id. at 444. 
"The warning mandated by Miranda was meant to preserve the 
privilege [against compulsory self-incrimination] during 
'incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere. '" Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 110 S.Ct. 
2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). 
"That atmosphere is said to generate 'inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist 
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.1" Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). 
In the present case, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in denying Swink's motion to suppress his statement because 
the undisputed facts establish the "salient features" of a 
custodial interrogation necessitating the Miranda warnings1: a 
compelled confession, "incommunicado interrogation," and a 
1
 "When a trial court bases its 'ultimate conclusions 
concerning . . . defendant's Miranda rights ... upon essentially 
undisputed facts . . . ! its conclusions present questions of law 
which we review under a correction of error standard." State v. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App.1993) (quoting State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App.1990), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 
117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)). 
7 
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"police-dominated atmosphere." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
A. Custody 
The trial court concluded that the facts of Swink's case did 
not amount to "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 444. 
R.71[3-4]. In so holding, the court adopted the "added 
imposition" test, a test used by a number of jurisdictions to 
determine whether an individual, already detained in a 
correctional facility, is in "custody." R.71[3]; see also 
Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying 
added imposition test in prison context); Garcia v. Singletary, 
13 F.3d 1487, 1491 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. 
Conely, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert denied, 
479 U.S. 830, 107 S.Ct. 114, 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986); Leviston v. 
Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 488 U.S. 
865, 109 S.Ct. 168, 102 L.Ed.2d 138 (1988); United States v. 
Cooper, 800 F.2d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); United States 
v. Willoucrhbv 860 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1988) (same), cert denied, 
488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 846, 102 L.Ed.2d 978 (1989); United 
States v. Menzer 29 F.3d 1223, 1232-33 (7th Cir 1994) (same). 
Without discussion of the facts, the court stated, "based upon 
this court's determination of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, this court is of the opinion that there . . . was no added 
imposition imposed in this particular case warranting the 
administration of the Miranda warnings." R.71[3-4]. The court's 
conclusion is in error. 
The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as 
8 
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"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis 
added) (footnote omitted). "'[A] court must examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but 'the ultimate 
inquiry is simply whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or 
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest.'" Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 
S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (quoting California v. 
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1275 (1983) (per curiam), quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 
492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)); 
Swink was in "custody" under Miranda because he was under 
arrest when questioned. 3 84 U.S. at 444. Both Pacheco and 
Officer Ford testified that Swink was in state custody when he 
was interrogated at Decker Lake, having been arrested on the 
fugitive warrant that issued when he absconded from Genesis. 
R.69[21,34j. Pacheco testified, moreover, that Swink was not 
free to leave because of the warrant, and that he had the 
authority as a youth corrections officer to detain Swink. 
R.69[21] . Hence, the trial court erred as a matter of law when 
it concluded that Swink was not in custody; the uncontroverted 
evidence establishes that Swink was under arrest and therefore 
"ha[d] been taken into custody" for purposes of Miranda. 384 
U.S. at 444; see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322. 
9 
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Yet, even if Pacheco and Ford had not testified that Swink 
was in custody, R.69[21,34], the balance of the evidence would 
still establish that Swink was "otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in [a] significant way," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, and 
that a reasonable person in his situation would not feel at 
liberty to leave. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324. In order to 
determine "custody" in circumstances outside of formal arrest, 
Utah courts have looked to four factors, including: "'(1) the 
site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused 
on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.'" State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996) (quoting Salt Lake City 
v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. 
Worthinqton, 970 P.2d 714, 715-16 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 321, set forth 
the same factors and determined that no single factor was 
"dispositive")2. "' [T]he only relevant inquiry is how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood 
2
 The trial court did not apply this test in its custody 
analysis, using instead a test to determine custody in the prison 
context. See infra. Discussion of the Mirquet factors is 
nonetheless appropriate on appeal because the record evidence 
concerning the content of the interview and the attendant 
circumstances is both ample and undisputed. See Mirquet, 914 P. 2d 
at 1147, 1149; State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 n.4 (Utah App. 
1993) . "When credibility is not an issue as to underlying facts or 
a trial judge has already made necessary credibility assessments, 
the material facts are not disputed, and there is no additional 
evidence relevant to the dispositive issues that can or should be 
adduced, an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial 
court to apply the governing rules of law to the facts." Id. at 
1149; see also Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 n.4. 
10 
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his situation.'" Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324 (quoting Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 
(1984)) . 
The record establishes that Swink was in custody under these 
factors. As to the first and third Mirquet factors (the "site of 
the interrogation" and the presence of "objective indicia of 
arrest"), 914 P.2d at 1147, the record shows that the questioning 
of Swink occurred at the Decker Lake youth detention center, 
R.69[12,29], an inherently "police-dominated atmosphere." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.3 As noted by this Court in State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), " [s]tation-house 
questioning lends itself to a finding of custody." Id. at 1105 
(citing Oregon v. Matthiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 
L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)) (holding defendant in "custody" 
where questioning occurred at police station); see State v. 
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah App. 1998) (defendant not in 
"custody" where questioning occurred in school office); 
Worthington, 970 P.2d at 716 (defendant not in "custody" who was 
questioned in his home). 
In addition, the questioning was conducted by Pacheco, a 
counselor and a youth corrections officer, R.69[10,21], as well 
as Officer Ford, a police officer and special functions agent for 
the Division of Youth Corrections. R.69[26-27,29]. Such a 
police/authority presence underscores the custodial nature of 
3
 The record is silent as to where the interview occurred 
inside Decker Lake, i.e. in an office, interrogation room, hallway, 
or in an otherwise isolated or secured area. 
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Swink's situation, and presents the sort of psychological 
pressures that undermine an individual's right against self-
incrimination. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 
S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) ("[q]uestioning by captors, 
who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually 
reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the 
suspect's will"); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (noting the 
psychological pressures that "in-custody interrogation" brings to 
bear upon suspects). 
Moreover, Swink was escorted to Decker Lake by a police 
officer. R.69[27]; see State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 356 (Utah 
App. 1993) (finding "custody" where defendant was driven to 
"government facility" in police squad car and "site [of 
questioning] was unilaterally chosen by the officers"). Prior to 
that, Swink had been free, and was even left under his own 
recognizance for an hour and a half until Ford picked him up. 
R.69[33]. At Decker Lake, Swink was stripped of his street 
clothing, put into a Decker Lake uniform, and searched for 
contraband. R.69[22]. At no point was Swink informed that he was 
free to leave. R.69 [10-34]; see Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105 ("it 
is pertinent to note that [defendant] was not specifically 
informed of his freedom to leave") (footnote omitted). Such 
"objective indicia of arrest," Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, would 
lead the reasonable person in Swink's position to believe that he 
was in custody. See Stansburv, 511 U.S. at 324. 
The second and fourth Mirquet factors ("whether the 
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investigation focused on the accused" and the "length and form of 
the interrogation") also compel the conclusion that Swink was in 
"custody." 914 P.2d at 1147; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
First, the interview was lengthy, lasting forty-five minutes. 
See Brandley, 972 P.2d at 82 (questioning was non-custodial 
because it lasted only ten or fifteen minutes); State v. Mincy, 
838 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah App. 1992) (questioning non-custodial 
because it lasted only five minutes). 
As to the content of the interview,4 Pacheco testified that 
the questioning was intended as an "intake interview" to 
determine where Swink had been; whether he was under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol; whether he needed medical 
attention; whether he was suicidal; and to secure the safety of 
Decker Lake and Swink. R.69[12-14]. 
Pacheco did not testify that he asked any questions directly 
relating to drugs or alcohol. R.69[10-25]. Instead, Pacheco 
asked general, open-ended questions about Swink's activity. 
Pacheco started out by asking "where have you been? What have you 
been doing?" R.69[14]. Swink responded that he and another 
Genesis participant ran away from the program. Id. Pacheco 
asked him a few more times for his story, and each time Swink 
would give Pacheco more details. Id. Pacheco testified that 
Swink's story still had "inconsistencies and holes [and] didn't 
make sense." R.69[15], He told Swink, "Brian, there's holes in 
4
 There was no transcript of the interview available to the 
court below. 
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the story. You know, fill me in more of what's been going on." 
Id. At that point, Pacheco testified that Swink "hesita[ted]" 
then, 
finally said, yeah. He said F it. He said, I'm going 
to get in trouble anyway, and so he then -- I said, I 
want to know the story from the time you left Genesis 
to the time you were picked up, and [Swink] started 
from that point. 
Id. After this exchange, Swink told Pacheco that he stole a 
screwdriver from a grocery store. R.69[16]. Pacheco then 
testified that Swink admitted he used the screwdriver to start, 
and then steal, a minivan. R.69[16-17]. 
Still unsatisfied with the story, Pacheco pressed further 
with the questions "to determine where [Swink] had been." 
R.69[17] . Swink clarified that he drove the van to South Towne 
mall, where he was chased by a security guard because he had 
"taken something." R.69[17-18]. Swink then told Pacheco that he 
drove away in the van and later "dropped it off." R.69 [18-19] . 
Pacheco asked Swink whether he "hot-wired" the van. R.69[17]. 
Swink "said no. . . . 1 started it and left." Id. 
Although characterized as an "intake interview" to determine 
whether Swink was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 
R.69[12-13], Pacheco's open-ended and persistent questioning 
style elicited obviously incriminating information from Swink. 
Rather than asking direct questions about drug and alcohol use, 
Pacheco asked Swink, "where have you been? What have you been 
doing?" R.69[14]. Moreover, Pacheco expressly told Swink that 
he did not believe him because there were "holes in [his] story," 
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R.69[15], changing the complexion of the interview from one of 
merely information gathering to an accusatorial questioning. See 
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105 (accusatorial questioning "weighs 
heavily in favor of a determination of custody"); Brandley, 972 
P.2d at 82 n.5 (holding questioning accusatory in part because 
officer told defendant that witnesses accused him of lewdness and 
his file contained incriminating information). A reasonable 
person under these circumstances would feel that he was the 
"focus of [an] investigation." Id. at 82. Indeed, Swink, at 
this point, responded to Pacheco's line of questioning with, "F 
it. . . . I'm going to get in trouble anyway" and then proceeded 
to admit that he stole the minivan. R.69[15]. 
The accusatory nature of the questioning is further 
underscored by the fact that it persisted long after Swink 
clearly admitted to numerous instances of criminal conduct, 
including absconding from the Genesis program, stealing a 
screwdriver from a grocery store, stealing the minivan and taking 
"something" from South Towne Mall. R.69[16-18]. "'The change 
from investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the 
'police have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been 
committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that defendant 
committed it.''" Snyder, 860 P.2d at 357 (quoting Sampson, 808 
P.2d at 1105-06; quoting Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171) . 
Indeed, both Pacheco and Ford testified that they understood 
that Swink had stolen a car. R.69[17,29-30,33-34]. Both men 
conducted questioning in light of that realization. Pacheco 
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asked Swink how he started the van and whether he "hot-wired" it. 
R.69[16-17]. Ford testified that he asked for the van's location 
once Swink "mentioned . . . that he'd taken a vehicle from 
downtown and had left it running." R.69[29,33-34]. 
This Court in Snyder addressed a similar situation, wherein 
the police discovered during the course of a non-accusatorial 
interview that the defendant was the man responsible for the 
crime under investigation. 860 P.2d at 357. This Court stated: 
[e]ven assuming that the initial questioning in this 
case was merely investigatory, the questioning became 
inarguably accusatory when defendant admitted that he 
was the man involved in the incident and that he had 
been masturbating immediately prior to the allegedly 
lewd display. 
Id. Pacheco and Ford's questioning likewise "became inarguably 
accusatory" when Swink admitted to stealing the van, as well as 
when he admitted to absconding from the Genesis program, stealing 
the screwdriver, and taking "something-[else]" from South Towne 
Mall. Id.; R.69[16-19]. Hence, the questioning was custodial in 
nature, compelling the conclusion that Miranda warning were 
necessary in this case. See Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1105. 
As noted supra, rather than the Mirquet analysis, the trial 
court adopted the "added imposition" test, R.71[3], an analysis 
used in other jurisdictions to determine "custody" in situations 
where the individual is already incarcerated at the time of the 
interrogation. See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427; Garcia, 13 F.3d 
at 1491; Conelv, 779 F.2d at 973; Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303; 
Cooper, 800 F.2d at 414; Willoughby 860 F.2d at 23; Menzer 29 
F.3d at 1232-33. 
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The trial court's application of this test assumes that 
Swink was incarcerated prior to the custodial interrogation. As 
noted by defense counsel below, R.70[12], the evidence actually 
suggests that Swink was not incarcerated prior to being taken 
into custody to the extent that he had absconded from the Genesis 
program and was not under any supervision in the several hours 
prior to the time when he turned himself in. R.69 [15-18] . 
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that Swink was 
incarcerated prior to the interview, the circumstances of this 
case still amount to "custody" under the "added imposition" test. 
In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 
381 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that prisoners subjected 
to custodial interrogations were protected by the Fifth Amendment 
and, therefore, entitled to Miranda warnings. Id. at 4-5 (citing 
Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 4 78) (reversing and remanding conviction for 
filing false tax returns based on statements taken from prisoner 
defendant by IRS agent without Miranda warnings). The Supreme 
Court has not defined "custody" in the prison setting however. 
See Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 
768 (1990) (denying certiorari review on issue of "custody" in 
prison setting for purposes of Miranda).5 
Other jurisdictions have developed the "added imposition" 
test to determine custody in the prison context. The Ninth 
Utah case law likewise does not address "custody" in the 
prison context for purposes of Miranda and therefore has not 
specifically set forth the "added imposition" test adopted by the 
lower court in this case. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals was among the first to articulate the 
test in Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. That Court stated, 
The concept of "restriction" is significant in the 
prison setting, for it implies the need for a showing 
that the officers have in some way acted upon the 
defendant so as to have "deprived (him) of his freedom 
of action in any significant way," Miranda v. Arizona. 
[] 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (footnote 
omitted). In the prison situation, this necessarily 
implies a change in the surroundings of the prisoner 
which results in an added imposition on his freedom of 
movement. Thus, restriction is a relative concept, one 
not determined exclusively by lack of freedom to leave. 
Rather, we look to some act which places further 
limitations on the prisoner. 
In defining this concept we adhere to the objective, 
reasonable person standard. 
Id.; see also Garcia, 13 F.3d at 1491; Conely, 779 F.2d at 973; 
Leviston, 843 F.2d at 303; Cooper, 800 F.2d at 414; Willoucrhby 
860 F.2d at 23; Menzer 29 F.3d at 1232-33. 
In applying this test, courts have looked at various 
factors, including the language used to summon the individual; 
the physical surroundings; the extent to which the individual is 
confronted with evidence of his guilt; additional pressure used 
to detain him; whether he was incarcerated prior to questioning; 
whether he initiated questioning; whether he was informed that he 
was free to leave or to not answer questions; whether he was 
under arrest; whether he had unrestrained freedom of movement 
during questioning; and whether he was placed under arrest at the 
termination of questioning. See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428; 
United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(citing Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297); United States v. Griffin, 922 
F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990)). As noted in Chamberlain, the 
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"custody issue ultimately 'focuses upon the totality of the 
circumstances.'" 163 F.3d at 503 (quotation omitted). 
Accordingly, the aforementioned factors need not all be present 
to find "custody," nor is the list exhaustive. Id. (citation 
omitted). 
In light of the foregoing, Swink was in "custody" under the 
added imposition test employed by the trial court. R.71[3]. In 
addition to the factors discussed supra, which establish that 
Swink underwent an "added imposition on his freedom of movement," 
Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428, it is significant that Swink was 
originally housed at Genesis. R.69[15]. Pacheco described 
Genesis as an unsecured facility and work program in which 
participants go out in to the community under the supervision of 
Genesis staff. R.69[12]. Decker Lake, by contrast, is a more 
secured facility where the inmates have less freedom of 
movement.6 See Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 501-02, 504 (prisoner 
defendant in "custody" because he was moved to a "higher-level 
security facility" when questioned). 
Accordingly, Swink's placement in Decker Lake, where he was 
put in Decker Lake issue clothing and searched for contraband, 
under arrest on the fugitive warrant, under the supervision of 
Pacheco, a Decker Lake youth corrections officer, and Officer 
6
 Although the record does not provide information as to the 
level of security at Decker Lake, it can be inferred from the facts 
presented that it is a more secured facility than Genesis to the 
extent that Decker Lake inmates are transferred to Genesis when 
they are placed on parole. R.69[12] . 
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Ford, represents an "added imposition on [Swink's] freedom of 
movement." Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428; R.69[10-12,21-22]. A 
reasonable inmate in Swink's position would not feel at liberty 
to do anything other than answer the questions asked of him by 
the authorities present. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324; 
Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. 
In sum, Swink was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84 
U.S. at 444. He was under arrest on the fugitive warrant when 
questioned by Pacheco and Ford. Moreover, under the factors set 
forth in Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147, as well as the "added 
imposition" test adopted by the trial court, Swink was under 
restraint amounting to formal arrest. A reasonable person in his 
situation would not feel at liberty to leave or do anything other 
than answer the questions asked by Pacheco and Ford. The trial 
court erred, therefore, in concluding that Swink's circumstances 
did not amount to "custody" for purposes of Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 
444; R.71[3]. 
B. Interrogation. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that 
the uncontroverted evidence established that Swink was not 
"interrogated" for purposes of Miranda. 3 84 U.S. at 444. The 
court noted the following in this regard: 
Furthermore, in this court's view, this court is of the 
opinion that the counselor, and there was a counselor 
involved in this discussion with Mr. Swink, consistent 
with his testimony in this court's view, first of all, 
. . . he didn't have prior knowledge of the specific 
criminal activity when he had this conversation with 
Mr. Swink. He also testified, in this court's view, 
and it seems to be reasonable and consistent that his 
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primary purpose was that of the safety of Mr. Swink, 
the safety of other individuals in the facility and the 
facility itself. That in essence, this was an intake 
interview. It lasted approximately 45 minutes in 
duration. Based upon the conversation, it appears that 
there was no coercion or compulsion of any nature in 
this court's view in any way. And for all those 
reasons, . . . this court•does not believe that the 
facts and circumstances necessitated the admonition, 
the Miranda admonition. 
R.71[4] . 
Miranda proscribes "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers" that occurs when an individual is in "custody." 3 84 
U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).7 The U.S. Supreme Court in Rhode 
Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 
(1980), expanded the definition of "interrogation" to include 
"express questioning or its functional equivalent." Id. at 300-
01. 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but 
also to any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect. 
Id. at 301 (footnotes omitted). " [T]he definition of 
interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of 
7
 Under Miranda, "questioning" does not include 
[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts 
surrounding a crime or other general questioning of 
citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by 
our holding. . . . In such situations the compelling 
atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody 
interrogation is not necessarily present. 
Id. at 477-78 (footnote omitted). Moreover, "[v]olunteered 
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment." Id. 
at 478. 
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police officers that they should have known were reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response." Id. at 302 
(emphasis original). "Although the question of whether a 
statement or comment is reasonably likely to evoke an 
incriminating answer is an inquiry resolved from the perspective 
of the defendant, [] it must be resolved in light of the 
officer's knowledge of the suspect's characteristics." State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1311 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301-03). 
Implicit in the definition of "interrogation" is the 
recognition that the "'interrogation environment' created by the 
interplay of interrogation and custody would 'subjugate the 
individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Innis, 446 
U.S. at 299 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58); see also 
Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 ("[i]t is the premise of Miranda that 
the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody 
and official interrogation"). "Questioning by captors, who 
appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually 
reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the 
suspect's will." Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297.8 
8
 The Miranda rule does not apply where there is no State 
action. See Colorado v. Connelv, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) . Although not 
disputed by the trial court or the State, it bears mentioning that 
Pacheco and Officer Ford are both government agents for purposes of 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Pacheco testified that he is employed as 
a counselor at the Decker Lake juvenile correctional facility and 
is classified as a youth corrections officer with authority to 
detain juvenile inmates. R.69[10,21]. Likewise, Ford testified 
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In light of the foregoing, the questioning initiated by 
Pacheco and participated in by Ford constitutes "interrogation" 
under Miranda. 384 U.S. at 444. The colloquies with Pacheco and 
Ford establish the interrogatory nature of the questioning of 
Swink. Pacheco testified to the following on direct and cross-
examination regarding the interview: 
State: [R.69[13]] Okay. You had this conversation [with 
Swink.] What did you talk about initially? 
Pacheco: Initially I just asked Brian where he'd been, 
you know, what he was doing.9 The point of my 
conversation was, A, to find out where Brian had been. 
But not only that, but I needed to know his demeanor. I 
also needed to know if he'd taken any drugs or alcohol. 
. . . If there's need for medical attention and/or his 
demeanor could be for suicide. . . . 
State: Okay, so your conversation focused on what he 
was doing, to find out if he was consuming any alcohol 
[R.96[14]] or drugs for the safety of Decker Lake and 
his own safety; is that right? 
Pacheco: Correct. 
State: Okay. So what happened after you had this 
conversation? What did you talk about then? 
Pacheco: The conversation was, you know, Brian, where 
have you been? What have you been doing? He started 
out with, I ran from Genesis with a kid. 
State: Does he say who? 
Pacheco: At that point he did not say who. Through the 
conversation, though, I did determine the individual's 
name. 
that he is a police officer and a special functions agent with the 
Department of Youth Corrections. R.69[26-27]. 
9
 The italicized portions of Pacheco and Ford's testimony 
indicate general questioning of Swink as to his whereabouts and 
activity and/or questioning as to the stolen car in particular. 
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State: Okay. After he's telling you about how he fled 
from Genesis, did you ask him any questions about what 
was going on once he was on AWOL status? 
Pacheco: I'd asked him where he'd been. . . . At that 
point he said he and the other kid had ran. They went 
somewhere, and didn't specify where. From there he 
ended up at South Towne Mall. 
State: Did you question him about that? 
Pacheco: I did. I asked him, you know, Where have you 
been? He said, The individual and I ran. We made a 
phone call at Maverick. We talked to somebody - again, 
not naming any names. He said he went up to Trolley 
[R.69[15] Square Mall and then down to South Towne 
Mall. So each time I had asked him, a little bit more 
of the story had come out. 
State: And his story is progressively changing. What 
does that mean to you? 
Pacheco: Well, the inconsistencies and the holes, it 
didn't make sense. The whole story was not there. 
State: So what was your response to these holes and 
inconsistencies (inaudible)? 
Pacheco: Once again I said, Brian there's holes in the 
story. You know, fill me in more of what's been going 
on. 
State: And did he? 
Pacheco: At one point, he did. He was hesitant. Then 
he finally said, yeah. He said F it. He said, I'm 
going to get in trouble anyway, and so he then - I 
said, I want to know the story from the time you left 
Genesis to the time you were picked up, and he started 
from that point. 
State: And he freely gave you that information? 
Pacheco: Correct. . . . He said that he and - the 
other juvenile's name was Azar, [] ran from Genesis. . 
. [R.69[16] [They] were picked up and taken to Azar's 
home and from Azar's home they had gone to a Smith's. . 
. . From Smith's, he said he stole a screwdriver and 
was dropped off at Trolley Square Mall. . . . 
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State: So he stole a screwdriver at Smith's and then 
what did he tell you? 
Pacheco: Said that he walked south on 7th East and he 
found a vehicle. 
State: What kind of vehicle, did he say? 
Pacheco: At the time, he did not say. He said the 
easiest ones to steal, and I said okay. You know, I 
named a few different vehicle brands. He said no, it 
was a mini-van. I says okay. He said that he jumped 
in - he says all you have to do is push the screwdriver 
into the ignition and it will start. He said he left 
with the [R.69[17] minivan. 
State: So Mr. Swink admits to you that he stole a mini-
van? 
Pacheco: Correct. 
State: What was your response to that? 
Pacheco: To continue with the story, to determine where 
he had been. . . . He said at that point that . . . he 
ended up in South Towne Mall. . . . [H]e said that at 
South Towne Mall he'd been chased by the security in 
the mall and . . . he had stated that he'd jumped into 
a van, started it and left. I'd asked him did he hot-
wire it. He said no. I said, Did you have the keys? 
He said, No; I started it and left. 
So that was kind of why I said there's more to this 
story and that's why I'd gone back to him and said, 
Let's hear the whole story. 
State: Did he eventually tell you that whole story? 
Pacheco: Yeah. . . . [R.69[18]] He said that he had 
taken something - . . . it was never determined what 
exactly - from [South Towne M]all. He did not say 
which store. At which point he said, I jumped into the 
van. He said, I was followed out by some undercover 
security. . . . He said at that point he drove away. . 
State: [R.69[19]] Did the Defendant, in reference to 
this mini-van that he stole, did he ever indicate what 
he did with that? 
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Pacheco: He said he'd dropped it off. We asked him 
where. He said it was about two blocks or a block away 
from where [Officer Ford] picked him up. At that point 
he said - he goes, In the pursuit when the security was 
following me, the screwdriver fell out, he said, so he 
just left it running and walked away. 
At that point, [Officer Ford] tried to get a closer 
location of where it was left so he could, A, determine 
if it was still there and notify a police officer to 
come and recover the vehicle. . . . 
[Cross-Examination] 
Defense Counsel: [R.69[21]] You said that one of the 
purposes for this intake is to determine if he is 
suicidal or needs medical attention because of the use 
of drugs. Did you make [R.69[22]] that determination? 
Pacheco: Through his demeanor and through his 
conversation, at that point, no, I didn't see that it 
was needed. 
Ford, present throughout Pacheco's questioning of Swink, 
likewise testified during direct examination that he questioned 
Swink about the stolen vehicle. 
Ford: I didn't really ask anything as far as details 
what Brian had been involved in until he had mentioned 
to Chris and I that he'd taken a vehicle from downtown 
Salt Lake and that he had left it running. 
State: So you were present and you overheard the 
Defendant's admission that he stole a mini-van and that 
he dumped it somewhere and left it running? 
Ford: Yes, I was. 
State: And what was your response once you overheard 
that? 
Ford: When I heard that, I was concerned that - because 
he had stated that he left the vehicle running and the 
doors unlocked and there was no key, I was concerned 
that there could be some public safety issues . . . or 
that the car may be stolen again, so I asked him to 
describe to me the exact location of the vehicle so 
that I could go and secure the vehicle. 
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R.69 [29-30] . Ford then testified that Swink gave him the 
location of the stolen van; that he located the van at that 
place; that he verified with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office that the van, in fact, had been reported stolen; and that 
he notified the Salt Lake City Police Department to recover the 
stolen van. R.69[31]. Ford reiterated upon cross-examination 
that it became apparent that Pacheco and Swink were talking about 
a crime, and that he asked Swink specific information about a 
vehicle that Swink indicated he stole. R.69[33-34]. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Pacheco's "intake 
interview" did not amount to "interrogation." R.71[4]. In fact, 
Pacheco's line of questioning amounts to "interrogation" because 
Pacheco and Ford should have known that it was "reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response" from Swink. Innis, 446 U.S. 
at 301. 
As an initial matter, the questioning was not specifically 
aimed at Swink's possible drug and alcohol use while on the lam, 
nor his mental state. Pacheco does not testify to any questions 
such as, "did you use any drugs?", "did you consume alcohol?", 
"are you feeling suicidal?". R.69[10-25]. Moreover, the State 
did not establish that Pacheco's questions were prescribed by 
statute or Decker Lake policy, or that they were otherwise 
"normally attendant" to intake at Decker Lake. Innis, 446 U.S. 
at 301; see also State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971-72 (Utah App. 
1993) (holding that defendant was not interrogated where officer 
asked questions prescribed by statute) (citing State v. Wilson, 
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701 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1985) (same)); see also State v. 
Dutchie. 969 P.2d 422, 426-27 (Utah 1988) (holding defendant was 
not interrogated where one officer asked questions off department 
questionnaire and where second officer asked name and age because 
such questions were "normally attendant to arrest and custody and 
were not likely to elicit an incriminating response"). 
Indeed, Pacheco's questions were uncharacteristic of an 
intake interview to the extent that they focused on Swink's 
general activity rather than his possible drug and alcohol use in 
particular. Pacheco testified that he generally "asked [Swink] 
where he'd been, . . . what he was doing." R.69[13]. Moreover, 
Pacheco•s questioning in this regard was not "off-hand[ed]" nor 
isolated. Innis, 446 U.S. at 303 (holding that "few off-hand 
remarks" made by police during "brief conversation" with 
defendant were not likely to elicit incriminating response); see 
also Singer, 815 P.2d at 1312 (few off-handed remarks regarding 
officers' family sentiment did not amount to interrogation). 
Rather, Pacheco's line of questioning continued for forty-
five minutes without a break, during which time he asked Swink at 
least ten times about his activity in a calculated effort to get 
the "whole story." R.69[15]. Pacheco testified that he 
intentionally persisted with this line of questioning because he 
felt there were "inconsistencies and holes" in the story. Id. 
Pacheco and Ford should have known that such a calculated and 
"lengthy harangue" as to Swink's activity was "likely to elicit 
an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. Hence, the 
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trial court erred in concluding that the intake interview did not 
amount to an "interrogation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; R.71[4]. 
The trial court's error is underscored given that both 
Pacheco and Ford should have known that Swink was particularly 
susceptible to Pacheco's questioning style. See Innis, 446 U.S. 
at 3 02 n.8. Police knowledge of a suspect's "unusual 
susceptibility . . . to a particular form of persuasion might be 
an important factor in determining whether [they] should have 
known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response." Id. 
Pacheco's testimony indicates that he asked Swink at least 
six times a general question about his whereabouts and activity. 
R.69[13 ("[i]nitially I just asked Brian where he'd been, you 
know, what he was doing"); 14 ("[t]he conversation was, you know, 
Brian, where have you been? What have you been doing?"; "I'd 
asked him where he'd been."; "I asked him, you know, Where have 
you been?"); 15 ("each time I had asked him, a little bit more of 
the story had come out"; "[o]nce again I said, Brian, there's 
holes in the story. You know, fill me in more of what's been 
going on.")]. At the end of this series of questions, Swink 
stated, "F it, . . . I'm going to get in trouble anyway." 
R.69[15] . Swink immediately proceeded to inform Pacheco and Ford 
about the stolen van. R.69[15-17]. 
Swink's statement was a verbalized indication to Pacheco and 
Ford that he was about to divulge incriminating information as a 
result of Pacheco's persistent and generalized questioning. It 
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is plain from Swink's choice of words (i.e., "I'm going to get in 
trouble anyway"), R.69[15], that the next statement from Swink 
would concern his criminal activity. Given this clear, 
verbalized indication that Swink was about to give incriminating 
information, Pacheco and Ford were obliged to administer the 
Miranda warnings. See Innisf 446 U.S. at 301-02. Their failure 
to do so, R.69[25,34], renders Swink's statements inadmissible 
and, consequently, the trial court's ruling as to interrogation 
clearly erroneous. R.71[4]; see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
To this end, the trial court's finding that Pacheco "didn't 
have prior knowledge of the specific criminal activity" is an 
unsound justification for its conclusion that Swink was not 
"interrogated." R.71[4]. Even if Pacheco did not have prior 
knowledge of Swink's criminal, Pacheco was on alert at the point 
that Swink stated, "F it. . . . I'm going to get in trouble 
anyway." R.69[15]. Such a statement is strongly suggestive of 
guilt of something, if not the specific offense itself. 
Accordingly, Pacheco and Ford were aware at that point that Swink 
had been involved in some sort of criminal activity and was 
willing to confess, necessitating Miranda warnings. 384 U.S. at 
444. 
Moreover, the trial court's finding is irrelevant to the 
interrogation analysis. It is the fact of the custodial 
interrogation that necessitates Miranda warnings in the present 
case. As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, " [i]t is the 
compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the 
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strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time 
the questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the 
Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning." 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 
48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). 
In addition to Swink's verbalized intent to divulge his 
criminal conduct, Pacheco and Ford should have known that the 
questioning would have "elicit[ed] an incriminating response" on 
account of Swink's youth and the fact that he turned himself in 
after absconding from Genesis. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302. At the 
time of the questioning, Swink was 17 years old. R.8 (booking 
sheet indicating Swink's age); see, e.g.. Fare v. Michael C , 442 
U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (considering 
age of juvenile defendant in assessing voluntariness of waiver of 
Miranda rights). Swink's youth likely made him even more 
susceptible to give incriminating answers in the face of 
questioning by authority figures like Pacheco and Ford, a 
counselor/youth corrections officer and police officer 
respectively. R.69 [10,21,26-27] . Moreover, although not 
indicated in the record, Pacheco and Ford were undoubtedly older 
than Swink, thus underscoring Swink's vulnerability to 
questioning by adults. 
The fact that Swink turned himself in to the authorities 
also indicates a state-of-mind that should have led Pacheco and 
Ford to understand that Swink would likely incriminate himself 
during questioning. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. As opposed 
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to being arrested on the fugitive warrant against his will, Swink 
turned himself in. R.69[28]. Such an act is indicative of 
Swink's remorse for running away and willingness to accept 
responsibility for his behavior. Under this guilty state-of-
mind, Pacheco and Ford should have understood that Swink would be 
particularly susceptible to confessing his criminal behavior 
while on the lam. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8. 
Other undisputed facts underscore the compulsion inherent in 
the questioning of Swink and, therefore, render the trial court's 
conclusion against interrogation clearly erroneous. R.71[4]. 
For example, as noted supra Point I.A., the interview occurred in 
a custodial setting. Swink was under arrest when the questioning 
occurred. R.69[21, 34]. Moreover, "other objective indicia of 
arrest" pervaded the atmosphere. Swink was questioned at Decker 
Lake, a secured correctional facility, by Pacheco, a counselor 
and youth corrections officer, and in the presence of Ford, a 
police officer. Swink was also placed in Decker Lake issue 
clothing and searched for weapons just prior to the interview. 
Such circumstances constitute the sort of inherently 
"incommunicado police-dominated atmosphere" that weakens a 
suspect's will and subverts his right against self-incrimination. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456. 
In addition, Pacheco's questions were permeated with his 
articulated and unequivocal disbelief that Swink was not telling 
the truth. In fact, Pacheco used this doubt tactic as a tool to 
get the "whole story." R.69 [15]. The following colloquy 
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evidences Pacheco's intent to employ this tactic in an effort to 
elicit details from Swink, as well as his success in deriving the 
desired information: 
State: And his story is progressively changing. What 
does that mean to you? 
Pacheco: Well, the inconsistencies and the holes, it 
didn't make sense. The whole story was not there. 
State: So what was your response to these holes and 
inconsistencies (inaudible)? 
Pacheco: Once again I said, Brian, there's holes in the 
story. You know, fill me in more of what's been going 
on. 
State: And did he? 
Pacheco: At one point, he did. He said F it. He said, 
I'm going to get in trouble anyway. . . . I said, I 
want to know the story from the time you left Genesis 
to the time you were picked up, and he started from 
that point. 
R.69 [15] . 
Pacheco got the hoped-for response because Swink, at this 
point, admitted that he stole a vehicle and proceeded to give 
details of the crime. R.69[15-18], Pacheco continued to express 
doubt as to Swink's story in an effort to elicit more information 
when he listed several vehicle brands in order to identify the 
make and model of the vehicle that Swink stole. R.69 [16] . After 
he ascertained that it was a mini-van, Pacheco once again told 
Swink, "there's more to this story. . . . Let's hear the whole 
story." R.69 [17] . Again, Swink responded with more information, 
explaining that he took "something" from South Towne Mall and 
then fled in the van. R.69[18]. 
In the face of such doubt and suspicion, especially when 
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that doubt and suspicion are used as a tool to elicit more 
information, a reasonable person in Swink's position would feel 
compelled to answer the questions. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 
(focusing on "perceptions of the suspect"). In fact, as evinced 
by the aforementioned testimony, Swink in fact gave incriminating 
information. Hence, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
where the undisputed facts establish that Pacheco successfully 
engaged in questioning deliberately designed to "elicit an 
incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 302; R.71[4]. 
As a final matter, the trial court erred in ruling that 
Swink was not interrogated where the questions posed to Swink 
directly related to the stolen vehicle and were, therefore, the 
sort of "express questioning" mandating Miranda warnings. Innis, 
446 U.S. at 300-01; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Once 
Swink admitted to stealing a vehicle, Pacheco asked direct 
questions about the details of the crime. For example, he asked 
about the vehicle's make, R.69[16]; whether he "hot-wired it . . 
. [or] ha[d] the keys," R.69[17]; where he drove the stolen 
vehicle, R.69[17-18]; and where he abandoned it, R.69[19]. Ford 
likewise asked direct questions about the stolen vehicle. Ford 
testified that it became clear that Swink stole a vehicle and 
that he had left it running someplace. R.69[30]. Accordingly, 
Ford "asked [Swink] to describe . . . the exact location of the 
vehicle so I could go and secure the vehicle." Id. 
As noted by the Innis Court, "Miranda safeguards come into 
play whenever a person in custody is subjected to [] express 
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questioning." 446 U.S. at 300-01. As evidenced by the facts 
marshalled above, Swink was subjected to express questioning 
about the stolen van while in custody. Accordingly, the trial 
court erred in concluding that Swink was not subjected to the 
sort of questioning necessitating the Miranda warnings. R.71[4]. 
In sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that the undisputed facts do not establish 
"interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
R.71 [3-4] . The lengthy interview did not consist of simple 
questions regarding Swink's possible drug or alcohol use. 
Rather, Pacheco engaged in a persistent line of open-ended 
questions calculated to elicit information as to Swink's activity 
in general. Moreover, although Pacheco and Ford were aware that 
Swink was about to divulge incriminating information in response 
to Pacheco's questions when he stated, "F it. . . . I'm going to 
get in trouble anyway," they nonetheless failed to Mirandize 
Swink. Instead, Pacheco continued with the same line of 
questioning, resulting in the sought-after information. 
Moreover, both Pacheco and Ford asked direct questions about the 
stolen vehicle once Swink admitted to that crime. 
Hence, under the circumstances, Pacheco and Ford engaged in 
"express questioning," as well as a line of questioning that they 
should have known would "likely result in an incriminating 
response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02. In so doing, they 
"undermine[d] [Swink's] privilege against self-incrimination" 
since they failed to Mirandize him. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 
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(citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58); R.69[25,34]. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Swink respectfully requests this 
Court to reverse the trial court's order denying his motion to 
suppress statements taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. The undisputed facts establish 
that Swink was subjected to a custodial interrogation. The 
undisputed facts likewise establish that he was not Mirandized at 
any point during the custodial interrogation. R.69[25,34]. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that his statement was admissible under the Fifth 
Amendment and Miranda, 3 84 U.S. at 444. 
SUBMITTED this \L|fV^ day of February, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
u ^ 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN SWINK, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991901631 FS 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Date: May 17, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: daleeng 
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SHAPIRO, DAVID 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 13, 1981 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED THEFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/12/1999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED THEFT a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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Case No: 991901631 
Date: May 17, 1999 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $250.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $212.50 
Due: $462.50 
Total Fine: $250.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $212.50 
Total Amount Due: $462.50 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $150.00 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: Amount: $1400.00 
Pay in behalf of: RESTITUTION 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 462.50 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol oi 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
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Case No: 991901631 
Date: May 17, 1999 
sold, or otherwise 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Pay $1,400.00 restitution. 
Interstate compact with the State of Iowa. 
Standard gang clause imposed. Work hours have to be completed 
before defendant goes to Iowa. 
The Court orders the defendant to serve 180 days jail and receive 
130 days credit for time served. 
Dated this 17 day of 
k 
E. MEDLEY 
ict Court Judi 
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